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This article is based on a survey of some 900 District Court judgments on appeal from the Disputes Tribunal. The period covered in the survey is from mid-1999 to mid-2003. An objective of this article is to publish the valuable lessons in adjudication contained in these judgments which, being unreported, would otherwise remain inaccessible. These judgments provide guidance for those involved in the Disputes Tribunal process and in other adjudicatory processes as well.
Appeal lies from the Disputes Tribunal to the District Court in terms of the Disputes Tribunals Act. This Act allows for appeal on the basis of procedural unfairness which prejudicially affects the outcome of the hearing.[1] The number of appeals lodged against orders of the Tribunal, in proportion to the number of claims heard, is small, and the great majority of appeals are unsuccessful.[2] This article examines the minority of appeals that have been successful, and focuses on the recurrent reasons for successful appeals. The article explores the lessons to be learnt in terms of running a fair hearing and the process of decision-making.
To offend and judge are distinct offices, and of opposed natures.[3]
The above words of Shakespeare provide a pointer to an essential attribute of good judging: the need to run a fair hearing. No judge can avoid displeasing one or another of the parties in the course of a judicial career.[4] Yet every judge should avoid causing hurt and resentment through conducting bad processes which breach the requirements of natural justice. As Chilwell J once remarked, there is “all the world of difference between a disappointed litigant and a disturbed litigant”, the latter being a person who has suffered an unfair process.[5]
In the District Court, a recurrent reason for successful appeal has been that the Referee who presided at the Tribunal hearing has processed matters too quickly and not given an adjournment where appropriate. Sometimes Referees have proceeded in this way with the best of motives. One of the objectives of the Tribunal is to provide a forum that provides speedy justice.[6] Thus, Referees have rightly had regard to the inconvenience to the parties of further hearings, and in recent years Departmental pressure has been brought to bear on Referees not to adjourn matters unnecessarily.[7] The conflicting demands on Referees have been reflected in cases taken on appeal. On one occasion, the appeal Judge remarked on the “rush to do justice” which resulted in an unfair process.[8]
District Court judgments have signalled that running a fair hearing requires that parties have adequate notice of the claim made, have sufficient opportunity of responding to evidence and argument, have adequate opportunity of producing material witnesses for cross-examination, are fairly dealt with in situations calling for interpreters or telephone conferences, and have enough time to present their case in full.
The District Court has affirmed that it is procedurally unfair to deal with a claim or an issue about which the opposing party has received no or inadequate warning.[9]
Where an order was based on a counterclaim made by the respondent three days before the hearing, the appeal was allowed for the following reasons:
The appellant had little or no effective time within which to investigate the counterclaim; no real opportunity to prepare in terms allowing them fairly to confront the assertion made.[10]
Where a claim for compensation was brought against a company, in the course of the hearing the claim was directed against the director personally pursuant to a guarantee. The Referee’s order against the director was overturned because:
The Referee has stepped outside the terms of the application in dealing with this pursuant to the guarantee, which was not part of the case when it commenced but became part during the hearing. The appellant was not forewarned of this, was not in a position to argue this and the Referee should not have proceeded on that basis. That amounts to a procedural unfairness.[11]
The District Court has stressed that natural justice requires that all parties be given proper opportunity to read, reflect upon and respond to submissions, particularly where they are lengthy and/or raise difficulties. The Court has observed that a further hearing might be necessary where further evidence and/or enquiries need to be made.[12]
At a hearing, a very detailed and comprehensive lawyer’s letter was presented in support of the respondent’s case. The applicant had no notice that the legal submission would be presented, he was not given proper opportunity to respond to the submissions, and he was not given the opportunity of an adjournment. The Referee’s decision was based on the lawyer’s letter. On appeal, the Judge observed:
When a lawyer’s letter is presented without prior warning a Referee should be assiduously careful to ensure that there is a proper balance and fairness between the parties. That should normally mean that a Referee should specifically provide the opportunity to the other party to ask for an adjournment to provide similar legal submissions if desired. At least there should be a short adjournment sufficiently long to give the party time to absorb the lawyer’s letter so that the party could properly respond to the letter.[13]
In another hearing, there was inconclusive evidence as to the costs of machining the recycled timber in question. The Referee decided to allow quotes for these costs to be submitted subsequent to the hearing. In relation to one of these quotes the Referee telephoned the business that had supplied the quote in order to clarify it. The Referee made the decision without a further hearing. On appeal, the Judge stated:
The information which was subsequently provided was not straightforward and the Referee herself sought to clarify it. Rather than endeavouring to contact the companies providing the quotes to see whether she could clarify the matter, the Referee should have called for a resumed hearing. The issue of unfairness can mean simply failing to conduct a hearing where all of the parties are given an opportunity of being heard or questioning the other parties, or calling witnesses and producing documents.[14]
The District Court has affirmed that a party must not be deprived of the opportunity to have witnesses heard on important matters, and that adjournment is necessary where a material witness cannot be present.[15] This procedure is required to avoid reliance on hearsay evidence, to provide for cross-examination of witnesses, and to allow the Referee to make the safest possible decision.[16]
A Referee declined to adjourn the proceedings so that witness evidence could be given, on the basis that the parties had had long enough to prepare their cases. The party applying for the adjournment did so because it had thought that it would succeed on its interpretation of the contract, and had not thought that it would be necessary to rely on the evidence of the witness which (it claimed) would offer conclusive evidence on the matter. The Judge commented perceptively:
It must be remembered that in this case the Referee was dealing with lay people and he almost always does. It is not infrequently the case that parties before Courts misjudge their own cases and do not have at immediate hand evidence which might be critical to the Court’s determination. In those circumstances the Court almost always entertains adjourning the proceedings so that crucial evidence may be presented, and the Court must turn its mind to the question of whether or not to refuse to do so would be unfair. The Referee failed to turn his mind to a critical issue, namely, whether there was evidence which would support a view contrary to the conclusion that he reached in the absence of that evidence.[17]
In another case, the outcome of the hearing was dependent on what was said during a key telephone conversation. Only one party to the telephone conversation was present at the hearing, and the other party’s version of the conversation was presented on her behalf by her husband. The Referee preferred the evidence of the witness who was present, without indicating the need for the other person’s direct evidence. The Judge allowed the appeal, commenting:
Where there is a dispute between two witnesses as to what was said in a telephone conversation, it is difficult to see how such a dispute can be resolved by a Tribunal without hearing from both parties. If only one party is there giving oral evidence, it is predictable that that party’s evidence will be preferred to pure hearsay evidence, unless there are some independent circumstances which might corroborate the account of one or the other. If there are no independent circumstances, it is really essential to hear both parties. The Referee would have seen how crucial the conversation was and so she should have positively given the party the opportunity to call his wife as a witness and at the same time advised the party that he would be at a serious disadvantage if he did not avail himself of that opportunity.[18]
New Zealand’s increasingly multicultural society has presented the Disputes Tribunal with new challenges. The District Court has pointed out the need for extra time or adjournment for an interpreter to be present, where parties or witnesses are not familiar with the English language. This is because the hearing room is a foreign environment for most of the population, and because in legal proceedings precision of language is important in terms of comprehension and argument.[19]
In one dispute, a Referee reluctantly proceeded with a hearing without an interpreter where the respondent could not adequately understand English. The Referee did not adjourn for an interpreter because the respondent’s 13-year-old son interpreted for his family, and because all the parties at the hearing were adamant that they did not wish to have an adjournment. The Judge allowed the appeal for the following reason:
A Court-appointed interpreter should have been present so that there could have been no suggestion that either party did not receive a fair hearing. An adjournment should have been granted and then fewer hearings would have been required in order for this matter to be determined.[20]
In another case, the Referee was faced with an application for an adjournment by a Samoan interpreter, on the ground that he had other commitments. The Referee declined this on the basis that the party in question (who had difficulty with the English language) had had plenty of time to get assistance before the hearing. The party then left the proceedings and a decision was given against him in his absence. The Judge noted the following:
There is unfairness where a party, faced with a foreign procedure, one that he was not familiar with and to be conducted in a language with which he is not familiar, is unable to use an interpreter or to get an adjournment to arrange a suitable person. To proceed in the absence of a participant when an application for an adjournment has been declined when it should have been granted is an unfairness.[21]
The potential inconvenience to a party who lives some distance from the residence of the applicant is minimised by the availability of a telephone conference at the local District Court.[22] However, the absence of the respondent in person presents particular challenges to the Referee in ensuring a fair hearing. The District Court has stated that where the party on the telephone is being prejudiced, by the nature of the hearing or by faulty equipment, the Referee should abandon the hearing and start afresh.[23]
In one dispute the initial hearing concluded with an agreement that the matter would be adjourned to address a specific issue, and that the party who lived away from the Tribunal could attend by way of a telephone conference. At the adjourned telephone hearing, the discussion developed into consideration of a much greater issue than had been envisaged. The Referee gave a decision at the end of the hearing on all the matters discussed. The Judge allowed the appeal of the telephone party and noted:
Given the initial limited scope of the telephone conference, when the nature of the telephone conference changed the Referee should have made clear that the Tribunal was going to proceed to make determinations on the broader issues, and that the telephone party had the choice of abandoning the telephone conference and coming to the Tribunal in person. The telephone party did not give any informed consent to the scope of the telephone conference changing, and were clearly prejudiced by the fact that they did not have a representative present in person to put all evidence before the Tribunal and to cross-examine the [other party].[24]
6. Adequate Time for Hearing
The District Court has affirmed that it is essential that sufficient time be given to parties to present all their evidence and allow opportunity for cross-examination, and that adjournment is necessary where the dispute is not resolved in the time allotted.[25]
A Referee decided to give her decision without calling two witnesses who could have given material evidence, because the hearing had overrun by 40 minutes and the following hearing was a teleconference. In allowing the appeal the Judge observed:
It is important that all witnesses are heard adequately and that the normal issues are put to those witnesses. Constraints of time should not preclude parties from calling material witnesses.[26]
In another case, the appellant contended that, because of certain delays at the commencement of the hearing, he was unable properly to present his case and that he had to “fast forward” through his video. The Judge granted the appeal and affirmed that “the appellant needed adequate time to present his evidence without the necessity to truncate the presentation of his case”.[27]
Are you acquainted with the difference that holds this present question in the court?[28]
Decision-making requires discipline of mind and will. It is helpful for the decision-maker, in maintaining tight discipline over the decision-making process, to check repeatedly if there is full “acquaintance” with the difference at issue. The above question needs to be asked by the decision-maker of himself or herself, and needs to be asked of the parties to the litigation.
In the District Court, appeals have been repeatedly allowed because Referees have not adopted a disciplined approach to decision-making. To be fair to Referees, theirs is a complex role. First, they are required to assess, before they proceed to determine a dispute, whether it is appropriate to assist the parties to negotiate an agreed settlement.[29] This requirement means that Referees are regularly involved in a mediation-type process. Secondly, where the Referee proceeds to determine the dispute (as occurs in the majority of cases), he or she is required to decide the dispute according to the substantial merits of the case having regard to the law.[30] This requirement allows Referees (most of whom are not legally trained) considerable discretion in balancing the overall equities of the matter with legal considerations. Thirdly, the Referees’ functions operate in a hybrid context designed to afford informality and therefore accessibility as well as being subject to natural justice processes.[31] It is not surprising that, in this context, Referees have sometimes betrayed irregular decision-making processes. On one occasion a District Court Judge commented that “[a] natural anxiety to see the whole matter resolved has produced as its by-product a process that was unfair”.[32]
District Court judgments have highlighted that there are a number of consequences of adopting a disciplined approach to decision-making. Before the decision-maker proceeds to a decision, he or she needs to check that the disputants are clear as to the issues that will be decided and that they have had the opportunity of being heard on all factors relevant to deciding those issues. The decision-maker must meticulously decide on each aspect of multi-faceted claims, must produce proper evidential support for the decision, and must provide a logical and principled basis for the decision. Finally, the decision-maker must reflect an “acquaintance” with the dispute through adequate written reasons in support of the decision and (if need be) the process adopted.
The District Court has repeatedly allowed appeals where Referees have given reserved decisions based on reasons which have not been canvassed at the hearing. This process has been seen to be a breach of natural justice, leaving the evidence, logic and thought-processes of the Referee untested, and the decision as a surprise to the parties.[33]
Reaching decisions, after a hearing, which rely on reasons to which one or other party has not been able to respond may be called the “Erebus phenomenon”. In the “Erebus Inquiry”, Mahon J made findings of “a pre-determined plan of deception” and “an orchestrated litany of lies”, without having foreshadowed these findings at the Inquiry. In so doing, Mahon J was held by the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council to have acted contrary to natural justice. The Privy Council stated that a person making a finding must “listen fairly to any relevant evidence conflicting with a finding, and any rational argument against the finding, that a person, whose interests may be adversely affected by it, ... would have so wished [to place before the decision-maker] if he had been aware of the risk of the finding being made”.[34]
In one Tribunal case in point, the question canvassed at the hearing was whether engine work had been done satisfactorily. In a reserved decision, the Referee held that the work had been unsatisfactory, but then made an order which substantially reduced the amount claimed on account of the delay in bringing the claim. The possible impact of delay on the decision was not raised by the Referee as a factor during the hearing. The Judge allowed the appeal and remarked:
It is procedurally unfair for a Referee to decide an important part of a claim adversely to a party unless the basis of that decision has been clearly raised at the hearing. Where they are material to the outcome, issues must be raised and appropriately dealt with before they are decided.[35]
In another case, a Referee made an order which had regard almost exclusively to the effect of the weather on the work done. Before the appellant received the decision, he was unaware that the weather would be an issue of importance to the Referee. The appeal Judge declared:
It is better to err on the side of caution rather than leave a party with a genuine sense of grievance at not being able to put before the Disputes Tribunal all relevant matters. There are grounds upon which it can properly be said that the appellant was denied an opportunity to put before the Referee all matters relevant to the effect of the weather on the property.[36]
The District Court has emphasised the need for Referees, where they are faced with claims comprising different parts, to decide explicitly on each part and to give reasons for each decision, rather than adopt an overall arbitrary assessment.[37]
An applicant presented a claim which was made up of two parts. The first part was for payment for services to assist in the setting up of a shop, and the second was for the use of a stereo player for a period of some months. The Referee held that there was insufficient evidence to establish an intention by the parties that there would be a legal relationship for the first claim. However, the Referee made no reference to the second part. The Judge allowed the appeal from the decision and said:
It is not objectively correct to say that the second issue was dealt with under part of the original decision. On an objective reading by a third party of the original decision, the [second] issue was not dealt with at all.[38]
In another claim the applicant sought the refund of the purchase price of a piano plus the delivery fee. The Referee made an order for the payment of part of the purchase price, but did not refer to the claim for the delivery fee. The Judge commented:
The Referee failed to have regard to the part of the claim seeking recovery of the delivery fee. The Referee needed to explain why the claim for delivery was apparently disallowed.[39]
3. Evidential Support for Decision
The District Court has referred to the fundamental requirement for Referees to have regard to, and back their decisions with, relevant evidence.[40] Where Referees have failed to provide evidence in support of the basis of their decision, there has been held to be prejudice and procedural unfairness.[41]
In one case the respondent had declined to complete a contract with the appellant for the purchase of property for $16000. The appellant later resold the property for $12000 and claimed $4000 in the Tribunal. In a reserved decision the Referee dismissed the claim on the basis that the appellant had failed to prove that the difference in price was solely attributable to the cancellation of the contract. In the decision the Referee suggested that the respondent may originally have been prepared to pay more than the market value or that the appellant had later been under pressure to sell and that this had prompted him to sell at a lower price. The Judge allowed the appeal and remarked:
The comments of the Referee indicated an acceptance of a hypothetical position which was not supported by any evidence referred to by the Referee. The Referee was introducing matters of opinion into what was largely a factual situation, rather than dealing with the claim on the evidence which was produced.[42]
In another case the respondent, a tax agent, brought a claim against his former client for accountancy fees. The Referee, after hearing the parties, awarded part of the claim. In his decision, the Referee wrote that the facts of the matter were in dispute and there was no conclusive evidence to support either party’s view. Nevertheless, the Referee held that, on the merits and justice of the matter, he was awarding the applicant 60% of his account. On appeal, the Judge observed as follows:
The proper way to approach adjudication was to heed the evidence; to measure its weight and merit on both sides; and to decide whether or not, in the end, the applicant had on the probabilities tipped the scales his way - so that he would either recover his account (the total amount of it) or would get nothing.[43]
4. Logical and Principled Basis for Decision
The District Court has affirmed that, where a Referee’s approach is illogical or without a sustainable basis, the issue of fairness in the process can arise and an appeal can be allowed.[44]
In a dispute the appellant claimed the unpaid balance of an account for work done. The respondents complained of problems in the work done, and so they counterclaimed the difference between the cost of rectifying defects in the work and the amount of the appellant’s claim. The Referee dismissed the appellant’s claim for the unpaid balance and ordered the appellant to pay the respondents most of the cost of rectifying the work. The Judge, in allowing the appeal, commented:
There has been a real mix up concerning the relationship between claim and counterclaim. The respondents have been given something of a double benefit. They have been relieved of the cost of the driveway work and given the benefit of the remedial work. That leaves them with a decided windfall.[45]
In another dispute the respondent bought a property from a third party which he immediately on-sold to a client of the appellant solicitor. The appellant did not act for the respondent. The appellant’s client initially gave express instructions to the appellant that the purchase price was not to be placed upon deposit, but this instruction was later varied. As a result of the default of the third party, settlement of the transaction was prevented on due date. The result was that the appellant held the purchase money for considerably longer than had been envisaged. In the reserved decision, the Referee referred to the Solicitors Trust Accounting Handbook, which provides that a solicitor has a duty to ensure that trust moneys earn interest with the benefit of the client concerned unless the client instructs otherwise. The Referee construed the reference to “client” as including the respondent, and awarded a claim for interest against the appellant. The Judge made the following pointed remarks:
The respondent never was the appellant’s client. To the contrary, the appellant had the opposing duty to protect the interests of his purchaser client to the exclusion of the interests of the respondent. There is therefore no factual or legal basis upon which this decision can stand. What a Referee cannot do is completely ignore the facts, misconstrue the reportedly legal provisions upon which she seeks to rely and produce a decision contrary to the interests of the appellant on that basis.[46]
5. Summary of Written Reasons
The Referee is required to give reasons for the final decision reached in the proceedings, but these reasons may be given orally or in writing.[47] The District Court has said that the failure to give written reasons can raise a question whether the Tribunal has addressed the dispute and decided the issues between the parties.[48]
At the conclusion of a hearing the Referee ordered a party to pay money to the other. The Referee gave reasons orally at the hearing, but did not record the reasons for her decision in the written order. The appeal Judge remarked on the difficulties which this process produced at the appeal hearing in determining what had happened at the hearing. The Judge noted the importance of written reasons particularly in view of the fact that “there is not usually any record of the proceedings before the Referee”. [49]
The Disputes Tribunals Act requires that, after a notice of an appeal has been lodged, the Referee who heard the proceedings must provide a report on the manner in which the proceedings were conducted, and the reasons therefor.[50] The District Court has said that it expects Referees to comment on the grounds of appeal, and that this certainly helps the appeal Court to decide what transpired at the hearing.[51]
In an appeal, the appellants alleged that the Referee had not allowed for the hearing of the appellants’ own evidence, although the Referee had heard the witnesses of the appellants. The Referee’s appeal report stated simply that the evidence of the appellants had been heard first, but the report did not draw a distinction between the appellants’ own evidence and the evidence of their witnesses. The Judge allowed the appeal and commented:
It is fundamental that, unless parties wish to give no evidence, they be afforded the opportunity to present their own evidence. The Referee’s report provides no latitude for any comfortable acceptance that these fundamentals were observed.[52]
A Daniel come to judgment: yea a Daniel! O wise young judge how I do honour thee![53]
In the trial scene in A Merchant of Venice, Portia was hailed as a Daniel (“Judge of God”) by one side and then by the other. Two key sources of her wisdom were her ability to facilitate a fair hearing and her disciplined grasp of the dispute at hand. The honour due to one who displays such qualities is equally appropriate in the very different environment of Disputes Tribunal hearings in New Zealand.
What lessons have emerged from the District Court judgments considered above? In terms of running a fair hearing, the message from the District Court Judges is that safety of process has priority over speed. This is evident in the Judges’ emphasis on parties being able to prepare, produce material witnesses, respond, argue, question and cross-examine adequately, and on Referees exercising care to ensure that there is balance and that neither side is seriously disadvantaged. In any judicial forum there will be judgment calls as to whether the interests of justice require further time or adjournment, bearing in mind the need to guard against unwarranted delays and abuse of process. But the clear lesson from the District Court judgments is that an elongated natural justice process is preferable to speedy injustice. The irony is that, by not adjourning hearings where appropriate, Referees have ended up prolonging proceedings by giving grounds for successful appeals and consequent rehearings of disputes.[54]
In terms of decision-making, the message from the District Court Judges is that rigorous attention to procedural and substantial justice has priority over flexibility and informality of approach. It is acknowledged that Referees are required to balance out a range of factors, relating to the possibility of agreed settlements, the need to be responsive to substantial merits and justice having regard to the law, and the need to make the Tribunal process as accessible as possible to lay disputants. But the District Court Judges have emphasised that these imperatives must not provide an avenue for arbitrary or whimsical justice. Judges have stressed the need for a measured, meticulous and thorough approach, in ensuring that all relevant issues are addressed, decided on a proper and sustainable basis, and adequately analysed in writing. This disciplined approach to decision-making, along with running a fair hearing, are essential to justice being done and being manifestly seen to be done.[55]
[*] Professor of Law, University of Waikato. This article is an edited version of a paper presented at the 2003 Conference of Disputes Tribunals’ Referees in Napier.
[1] Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 50(1).
[2] The 1986 Review of the Small Claims Tribunals recorded that 4% of decisions were appealed against and that in 13% of these the Tribunal’s decision was altered (P Oxley, Small Claims Tribunal Evaluation. Volume 1: Discussion Paper (Policy and Research Division, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1986) 85). Department of Justice/for Courts statistics for the period 1992-96 revealed that appeals averaged at around 4% of Tribunal decisions.
[3] Merchant of Venice II.IX.60-61, a Shakespearean play about mercy and justice.
[4] Television New Zealand Ltd v Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 24, 45, per McKay J (“at least one party is likely to be dissatisfied”).
[5] Connell v Auckland City Council [1977] 1 NZLR 630, 634.
[6] Oxley, supra note 2, at 92.
[7] The Departmental “Disputes Tribunal Performance Indicator” is that 80 percent of claims will be disposed of within 90 days of the date of filing (Departmental Forecast Report For the Year Ending 30 June 2003 (presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to s 34A of the Public Finance Act 1989) 38).
[8] Pierce Landscape Co Ltd v Clark and Clark, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 367/01 & 757/01, 19/7/01, per Joyce DCJ.
[9] Auto Court Ltd v Douglas, unreported, DC Dunedin, DT 57/00, 5/7/00.
[10] Pierce Landscape Co Ltd v Clark and Clark, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 367/01 & 757/01, 19/7/01, per Joyce DCJ.
[11] Hofman v Hodder, unreported, DC Christchurch, DT 1445/99, 14/3/00, per Hattaway DCJ.
[12] Martin v L’Estrange-Corbett, unreported, DC North Shore, DT 1925/99, 6/9/00.
[13] Boddy v Meredith, unreported, DC Palmerston North, DT 468/00, 17/5/01, per Becroft DCJ.
[14] McGhie v Farmhouse Group Ltd, unreported, DC Hastings, DT 119/02, 31/10/02, per Perkins DCJ.
[15] Downsix Systems Ltd v Hagley Building Products Ltd, unreported, DC Christchurch, DT 1031 & 1879/01, 13/11/01, per Holderness DCJ.
[16] Fastcat Ferries Ltd v Dew Trustee Co Ltd, unreported, DC Blenheim, NP 454/00, 20/12/00.
[17] Joyce Group Ltd v Tregenza Ltd, unreported, DC Timaru, DT 94/02, 23/10/02, per Erber DCJ.
[18] Sole v Gavin Chan Decorators Ltd, unreported, DC Wellington, DT 60/01, 2/11/01, per Tuohy DCJ.
[19] Brauner v Brand, unreported, DC Wellington, DT 380/00, 4/9/00.
[20] Guang Zhou Xu v Littlejohn, unreported, DC Manukau, DT 884/00, 6/3/01, per McAuslan DCJ.
[21] Leota v Jones, unreported, DC Christchurch, DT 412/02, 11/6/02, per Doherty DCJ.
[22] Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 60(2)(ga): “the giving of evidence from a distance (for example by video link or telephone conference)”.
[23] Peter Munro Commercials Ltd v Todd, unreported, DC Dunedin, DT 103/00, 15/11/00.
[24] Media Connections Ltd v Eventpro Ltd, unreported, DC Wellington, DT 324/00, 4/12/01, per Becroft DCJ.
[25] McWhirter v Thanh, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 1870/01, 31/1/02.
[26] Lemmon v Smal, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 1441/00, 31/1/01, per Cadenhead DCJ.
[27] Campbell v Williams, unreported, DC Whangarei, DT 358 & 359/99, 9/3/00, per Tompkins DCJ.
[28] Merchant of Venice, IV.1. 167-168.
[29] Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 18(1).
[30] Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 18(6).
[31] See Spiller, P The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand (2nd ed, 2003) 7-10. For example, Referees may have regard to any relevant evidence, even if this is not admissible in a court of law, but evidence must be shown to both parties for the opportunity to comment on it (Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 40(3)-(4)).
[32] Pierce Landscape Co Ltd v Clark and Clark, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 367/01 & 757/01, 19/7/01, per Joyce DCJ.
[33] Clark v Young, unreported, DC Alexandra, DT 127/99, 16/2/00.
[34] Erebus Royal Commission; Air NZ Ltd v Mahon [1983] NZLR 662, 671. See also Erebus Royal Commission; Air NZ Ltd v Mahon (No 2) [1981] 1 NZLR 618.
[35] Ward v Graham Page Engine Reconditioning, unreported, DC Dunedin, DT 387/00, 18/1/01, per MacAskill DCJ.
[36] Bjerring v Lennsen, unreported, DC Hamilton, DT 384/99, 9/2/00, per Willy DCJ.
[37] Ward v Graham Page Engine Reconditioning, unreported, DC Dunedin, DT 387/00, 18/1/01.
[38] McCausland v Magazine Action Gifts Ltd, unreported, DC Wellington, DT 287/01, 23/7/01, per Tuohy DCJ.
[39] Sheffield v Bennett, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 2589/00, 23/8/01, per Boshier DCJ.
[40] Furneaux v Korunic unreported, DC Christchurch, DT 2145/99, 8/8/00.
[41] Swinson Wall Coverings Ltd v Pitches, DC Auckland, DT 2996/00, 23/8/01, per Boshier DCJ.
[42] Arieli v Martin, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 390/00, 5/10/00, per Toomey DCJ.
[43] Yu v Weston and Associates, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 31/01, 19/7/01, per Joyce DCJ.
[44] Delany Transport Ltd v Goodwin, unreported, DC Nelson, DT 282/02 and 302/02, 22/5/03.
[45] Pierce Landscape Co Ltd v Clark and Clark, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 367/01 & 757/01, 19/7/01, per Joyce DCJ.
[46] Paul Cheng & Co v Beer, unreported, DC Wellington, DT 888/00, 5/4/01, per Willy DCJ.
[47] Section 21(1)-(2). However any party to the proceedings may, within 28 days after the hearing, require written reasons (s 21(4)).
[48] Anderson v Hawken, unreported, DC New Plymouth, DT 162/01, 23/10/01.
[49] L & J Silage Ltd v O’Leary, unreported, DC Timaru, DT 21/01, 22/4/02, per Ryan DCJ.
[50] Section 51(1).
[51] Foodstuffs (AK) Ltd v Auckland Towing Co Ltd, unreported, DC Auckland, DT 1372/01, 12/11/01.
[52] Richards v Moore, unreported, DC Palmerston North, DT 266/01, 1/11/01, per Lovegrove DCJ.
[53] Merchant of Venice IV.1.220-221.
[54] Guang Zhou Xu v Littlejohn, unreported, DC Manukau, DT 884/00, 6/3/01, per McAuslan DCJ.
[55] R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1923] EWHC KB 1; [1924] 1 KB 256, 259.
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